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I INTRODUCTION 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) has been heralded as a major shift 
to the political Left for New Zealand industrial law. This shift has been met with 
optimism and derision, the latter largely by employers. What follows is a comparison of 
substantive and procedural redundancy law under the former legislation, namely the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) and the current ERA position. This paper does 
not seek to compare the whole of both acts, so is intentionally limited to a discrete 
(although important) area of industrial law. What will become apparent however, is that 
although the overall shift in policy has been great, the end result for redundancy as a 
discrete area of the law is not as radically different as many employers would believe. 
II REDUNDANCY UNDER THE ECA 
A What was "Redundancy" under the ECA? 
The ECA did not set out to define redundancy. In fact, no substantive mention of 
it was made at all, anywhere in the Act. A useful definition of redundancy is given in G 
N Hale & Son Ltd v Welhngton etc, Caretakers, etc IUW per Somers J: 1 
It would be difficult to improve upon the definition of ' redundancy ' contained in s 184(5) of the 
Labour Relations Act 1987, namely. a tennination of employment 'attributable, wholl) or 
mainly, to the fact that the position filled by the worker is, or will become, superfluous to the 
needs of the employer. ' While that definition is expressed to be for the purposes of s 18-l it 
accurately conveys the ordinary understanding of redundancy. 
This definition has also been accepted by other commentators, as relevant for the 
purposes of the ECA: "In the absence of a definition in the EC Act, the above can be 
regarded as being close to a currently accepted definition of redundancy. " 2 Although the 
definition has been said to "fail to convey the spectrum of redundancy ... in particular 
that redundancies tend to fall into two broad categories. "3 The relevant category for the 
purposes of this paper is the second mentioned: "where the employer alters or purports 
1 G N Hale & Son Ltd v /Ve/ling/on, etc, Caretakers, etc, 1 UIV [19911 I NZLR 151 , 158 (CA). 
2 Stephen Gibbs (ed) Buttenvorths E111ployment Law Guide (3 ed. Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 951. 
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to alter the job description .. . the question whether. .. a redundancy exists becomes one 
of degree. "4 
B The ECA and Redundancy 
l Introduction 
The long title of the ECA stated it is an Act to promote an efficient labour 
market by (inter alia) providing for freedom of association and allowing parties to 
employment contracts to negotiate individual or collective agreements . Section 9 stated 
the parties: (a) may conduct negotiations on their behalf; and (b) appropriate 
arrangements to govern the employment relationship and the type of contract and its 
contents are a matter for negotiation. Thus the ECA involves an underlying theme 
promoting freedom of contract. 
Section 27(1) defines what constitutes a personal grievance, including in section 
27(l)(a) unjustified dismissal. Section 32 states every employment contract shall 
contain an effective procedure for settling any personal grievance, which must not be 
inconsistent with the Act. Section 40 concerns the remedies available for a personal 
grievance, once found. Section 40(l)(a) states reimbursement of lost wages or other 
money 1s an available remedy; while section 40(l)(b) states reinstatement is also 
available. Section 46(3) states the Court cannot specify the level (or a formula to 
calculate it) of a redundancy payment, if the contract is silent as to this. Finally, section 
104(3) states the Court cannot, in the exercise of its equity and good conscience 
jurisdiction, make decisions contrary to the ECA or any applicable employment 
contract. These sections indicate that the ECA focuses the Court ' s role on unfairness or 
other irregularity and prevents it from changing or reinterpreting a contract in a manner 
otherwise than the parties intended . 
3 Butlerworlhs Employment Lall' Guide, above, 951. 
4 Butlerworths Employment Law Guide, above, 95 I . 
Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin is arguably the leading case for promoting 
strict adherence to the ECA's underlying policy of contractual freedom. It states that the 
ECA: 5 
Represents a substantial departure from the collectivist principles of previous industrial relations 
legislation in favour of a model of free contractual bargaining. The Act departs from the 
common law of contract in setting the yardstick of unjustified dismissal ... in specifying 
procedures and remedies, and in other respects... the context in which [personal grievances] 
operate is sharply changed by the emphasis in the [ECA] on contractual freedom . 
The Aoraki-ECA approach had a considerable impact on the previous law regarding 
redundancy. Before discussing this however, it is helpful to outline what that previous 
legal position was; as before this case the Courts had arguably given the ECA's 
underlying contractual freedom policy (as construed by Aoraki) less effect. 
2 Previous decisions under the ECA 
The leading ECA redundancy case pnor to Aoraki was Brighouse Ltd v 
Bilder beck. In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the earlier reasoning of G N Hale & 
Son Ltd v Wellington, etc, Caretakers, etc, IUW, which outlined the then current 
position in relation to redundancy. Hale held that in order to justify dismissal on 
redundancy grounds, it was not necessary to show that dismissal was unavoidable, or 
necessary to ensure the survival of the employer's business.6 It further held that the 
genuineness of an employer's commercial reasons for redundancy may be examined by 
the Court, but the adequacy of those reasons was a matter for the employer's judgment: 
"It is the good faith of that basis and the fairness of the procedure followed that may fall 
to be examined on a complaint of unjustified dismissal. .. but the Court [is] not sitting 
on appeal as to how the employer should run the business." 7 Cooke P further stated 
( obiter) that he "had no doubt that a dismissal for redundancy must be carried out by a 
fair procedure. "8 
5 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276, 286 (CA). 
6 G N Hale & Son Ltd v Wellington, etc. Caretakers, elc, 1 Ulf' (Hale) [ I 991] l NZLR 15 L 158 (CA). 
7 Jlale , above, 155. 
8 Hale , above. 156. 
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Hale therefore sets the Court's role in redundancy cases, as ensuring that "the 
broad principle . .. [ of] what is open to a reasonable and fair employer to do in the 
circumstances,"9 is satisfied, in terms of the employer's actions . This involves a two-
step test: firstly , that the redundancy decision itself is genuine, in terms of its 
justifiability by the employer and secondly, that a fair procedure in implementing the 
decision is used . This case broke new ground by holding the adequacy of any 
commercial reasons that led to a decision could not be examined by the Court. Prior to 
Hale, many cases involved a detailed investigation into the commercial nature of the 
decision. 10 After Hale , redundancy hearings were limited to this two-step test, with the 
primary focus being on procedural fairness . 
In terms of the genuineness requirement, Richardson J held that the Court could 
" scrutinise with care claims that dismissals were for redundancy reasons and to expect 
an adequate commercial explanation from the employer for the course adopted." 11 But 
Cooke P held, "the existence of remedies for unjustified dismissal, should not be treated 
as derogating from the rights of employers to make management decisions genuinely on 
[business grounds]."12 Genuineness under Hale is therefore a question of justification by 
the employer, but not regarding the adequacy of its business decisions to make 
employees redundant. 
Hale procedural fairness involves a number of considerations, " [ which] on the 
facts of particular cases . .. will extend to the manner of selecting the worker. .. [to be] 
declared ... redundant and giving [them] a fair opportunity to make representations on 
the possibility of redeployment. " 13 The focus since Hale has been on the overall fairne ss 
of the procedure used in implementing the decision to dismiss for redundancy, 14 rather 
than on the actual business decision of the employer. No set of absolute requirements 
was given, only that the procedure used was fair on the facts of particular cases. 
9 Hale, above, 156. 
10 Stephen Gibbs (ed) Buttenvorths E111ploy111en1 Law Guide (3 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 956. 
11 G N Hale & Son L!d v /Vellington, etc, Caretakers, etc, JUIV (Hale) [1 99 1] I NZLR 15L 158 (CA). 
12 Hale, above, 155. 
13 Hale, above, 156. 
14 Stephen Gibbs (ed) Butterworths E111ploy111ent law Guide (3 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 956. 
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At this point, it is convenient to briefly depart from Hale to discuss other 
decisions concerning the main procedural fairness aspects raised by this case: selection 
criteria and consultation. In relation to selection criteria for redundancy, Dunn v 
Methanex NZ Ltd held that under the parties' employment contract, it was for the 
employer to choose the criteria to be used when selecting employees to be made 
redundant, on efficiency grounds. This was qualified by the requirement that the criteria 
adopted were relevant: 
15 
The respondent [employer] was entitled to choose the criteria which it would use .. . provided 
only that it confined itself to relevant special skills or attributes. 
Chief Judge Goddard then summarised the requirements necessary for the Court to 
interfere with an employer's chosen criteria: 
16 
[Where]: 
• the employer has not formed the requisite opinion at all ; or 
• no reasonable employer could have formed tl1e opinion tl1at the skill or attribute relied on 
could render tl1e employees selected for retention necessary for effective and efficient 
operations; or 
• tJ1e employer had no material known to it on which it could support its selection, such as if it 
closed its eyes to tl1e facts tlvough a failure to infonn and inquire; or 
• the employer's assessment has been influenced by wrong motives or a failure to consider 
relevant criteria or consideration of irrelevant criteria. 
Dunn therefore states it is for the employer to choose the selection criteria 111 a 
redundancy procedure, if this is intended by the employment contract. But in terms of 
procedural fairness, the criteria must be chosen in good faith and must also be relevant 
to the task of selecting employees with the requisite skills or attributes for any 
restructured positions. 
Although Phipps v New Zealand Fishing lndustty Board was decided after 
Br;ghouse, it is useful to consider it here. In the Employment Court, Chief Judge 
15 Dunn v A!ethanex NZ lid (Dunn) [ 1996] 2 ERNZ 222, 230 (EC). 
16 Dunn, above, 231 . 
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Goddard held consulting employees prior to a redundancy decision was mandatory for 
an employer: 17 
No genuine reasons can be formed about. .. redw1dancy .. . in the absence of input from the 
employee concerned, or at least a reasonable opportunity in which to contribute it . . . A failure to 
inquire or consult is fatal to justification. 
Interestingly, Chief Judge Goddard held that the correct inquiry under an ECA 
redundancy case was whether an employer had, "answered the [employee's] grievance 
that she had been unjustifiably dismissed by showing that the admitted dismissal was .. . 
justifiable." 18 This would only be shown if, "the action taken by the respondent was 
such as a fair and reasonable employer would have taken, or could have with a clear 
conscience." 19 Therefore, Phipps did not apply a separate two-stage test to the question 
of a redundancy's justifiability, but rather a general inquiry into its fairness and 
reasonableness. This difference is arguably not of great importance as with respect, it 
falls as an issue of semantics. 
As mentioned above, Brighouse adopted the two-step Hale approach. All five 
judges accepted that procedural fairness was relevant and that in cases of a failure to 
observe it, compensation was payable.
2° Cooke P held: "In considering the duties of a 
reasonable employer it is often convenient to use as different heads of discussion 
substantive justification and procedure, but there can be no sharp dividing line."21
 
Cooke P further held, in relation to procedural fairness requirements:22 
As indicated in Hale [the Courts] are entitled to take account of such aspects as whet11er. .. 
counselling or payment for it [is given], possibilities of redeployment have been adequately 
explored [but t11at t11e Court] would be going beyond [its] province if [it] held the (lower courts] 
could not have regard to such aspects ... as t11ey [thought] fit. 
17 Phipps v New Zealand Fishing industry Board (Phipps) [1996] I ERNZ 195, 208 (EC). 
18 Phipps, above, 208. 
19 Phipps, above, 208. 
20 Stephen Gibbs (ed) Buttemorths E111ploy111ent Law Guide (3 ed, Butterwort11s, Wellington, 1997) 956. 
21 Brighouse Ltd v Bi lderbeck (Brighouse) [ 199 5] l NZLR 158, 166 (CA). 
22 Brighouse, above, 167. 
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This indicates Cooke P did not consider the procedural fairness category closed, but 
that, per Richardson J, "the content of procedural fairness [to be considered] depend[ ed] 
on the class of case, [but did not include] the operational requirements of the 
employer."23 
The following summary of compensation for redundancy under Hale was 
accepted in the Court of Appeal by Sir Gordon Bisson in Brighouse :
24 
(1) Not every redundant employee is entitled to compensation. 
(2) In considering the overall duty of fair treatment [incumbent] on every employer, the Court 
may inquire whether t11e case calls for compensation. 
(3) In t11e absence of a prior agreement to pay compensation ... t11e answer to ... whet11er t11e duty 
of fairness calls for such a payment depends on circumstances such as: 
- The reason for redundancy; 
- The [employee's] lengt11 of service: 
- The period of notice of the dismissal ; 
- The means of the employer to pay. 
( 4) Circumstances calling for a compensatory payment as part of t11e overall duty . . . may arise in 
t11e absence of prior agreement where, for example, an employer has voluntarily decided on 
redundancy ... and can reasonably a.1Iord to pay. 
But Brighouse also broke new ground in terms of its interpretation of the ECA 
regarding redundancy compensation. Cooke P stated, regarding the ECA's approach to 
personal grievances, that they had not been limited to prevent discretionary 
· 25 compensation : 
The Act did not in general curtail t11e personal grievance provisions which in one form or 
another have been part of New Zealand statute since 1970 ... The remedies under ss 40 and 4 I 
are wide and flexible ... A notable feature of the [ECAJ is its extension of personal grievance 
jurisdiction by making personal grievance procedure available under every employment 
contract ... The availability of discretionary personal grievance remedies in redundancy cases 
had been demonstrated in lffale J ... If Parliament had intended to prevent such a result in future . 
it is surprising tlrnl tl1e [ECA] did not so provide. 
23 Brighouse, above, 170. 
24 Brighouse, above, 188. 
25 Brighouse ltdvBilderbeck (Brighouse) [1995] l NZLR 158, 163-16-l (CA). 
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Cooke P further stated, regarding the Court's role: 26 
It is clear ... this Court would not be entitled to impose fetters on the exercise of a statutory 
jurisdiction which Parliament has chosen to confer in very wide terms. Still less would we be 
entitled to say that compensation for redundancy need only be given where there is an express 
agreement to t11at effect. .. It is not for us to try and render certain that which t11e legislation has 
left flexible. 
Cooke P then held that there was no general right to redundancy compensation, but :
27 
Where no express [contractual redundancy compensation] provision applies, t11e ordinary 
personal grievance procedure will be available and t11ere will be jurisdiction to award 
compensation for any benefit, whetl1er or not of a monetary kind, which t11e worker might 
reasonably have been expected to obtain if the personal grievance had not arisen. 
Casey J agreed with Cooke P, stating:28 
Whet11er tl1at obligation [ of trust and confidence] can extend to payment of redundancy 
compensation when none has been provided for in the employment contract is more difficult . .. 
lbut] there will. .. be many cases where employees simply do not have t11e ability to procure 
satisfactory redundancy deals as part of their contracts. The personal grievance procedure affords 
a way of redressing t11e balance in those situations ... The present case provides an example. 
Similarly, Sir Gordon Bisson held that the Court may impose obligations on employers 
to pay redundancy compensation where the employment contract is silent.
29 
Brighouse therefore confirmed under the ECA, the Court's jurisdiction to award 
compensation to redundant employees if their contracts did not specify any redundancy 
payment, if in the circumstances compensation was considered necessary . These 
circumstances were to be based upon the principles and the employer's implied duty of 
fairness, as outlined in Hale. However, it is necessary to state Cooke P also held that if 
the employment contract specifically stated no redundancy compensation was to be 
paid, it would normally not be awarded.30 
26 Brighouse, above. 167. 
27 Brighouse, above, 167. 
28 Brighouse, above, 179. 
29 Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck (Brighouse) (1 995] I NZLR 158, 188 (CA). 
30 Brighouse, above, 167. 
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Therefore, pre-Aoraki the Courts held that redundancy involved a two-step 
investigation: firstly, whether the redundancy was in fact genuine - but not involving the 
employer's commercial or economic justification for their decision. Secondly, whether 
the process used to effect the redundancy was procedurally fair; involving a number of 
independent factors. Procedural unfairness aside, compensation was payable without the 
need for expressly including it in an employment contract, as long as the Court 
considered it necessary. 
Arguably, the ECA had been interpreted to ensure an equitable outcome for a redundant 
employee was possible; notwithstanding the emphasis in the Act on contractual freedom 
and therefore, the requirement that parties to employment contracts needed to include 
redundancy provisions expressly, to make them a part of their agreement. 31 This 
interpretation need not be considered as solely judicial activism however, as the reader 
must bear in mind the words of Cooke P, where Hale-type discretionary personal 
grievance remedies, prior to the ECA, were discussed: 32 
If Parliament had intended to prevent such a result in future, it is surprising that the [ECA] did 
not so provide. There is nothing in the Act to indicate any such intention. It may well be that the 
question was not even considered. 
3 The Aoraki approach 
(a) Introduction 
Aoraki Cmporalion Ltd v McGavin overruled Brighouse in favour of a stricter 
approach, which was intended to more closely mirror the underlying contractual 
freedom policy of the ECA. It is important to remember however, that Aoraki still 
required a genuine redundancy and a procedurally fair process (as will be seen); it 
therefore did not totally overrule the preceding cases outlined above. 
31 See for example section 104(3) of the ECA; as outlined below. 
32 Brighouse, above. 164. 
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On the facts, Aorak; involved a genuine redundancy situation, resulting in many 
employees losing their jobs. The focus of the decision was therefore on the procedural 
fairness aspects of the redundancy in question and the compensation payable as a result. 
As mentioned above, the approach of the Court of Appeal to the ECA was based on a 
strict application of the principle the Court held was fundamental to the Act: free 
contractual bargaining. 33 The Court held that under the long title of the ECA, 
"employment issues are a matter of contract where the types of contract and the content 
are essentially for the parties freely to negotiate."34 
(b) Implied terms and interpretation 
Regarding implied employment contract terms (such as redundancy 
compensation) the Court held that sections 9 and 43 were "particularly relevant in 
considering the scope for implying terms in employment contracts under the Act."35 The 
Court stated that section 9 was relevant because: 36 
In terms of s9(b) the object of Part II relating to bargaining is to establish that appropriate 
arrangements to govern the employment relationship may be made by employment contracts 
with ' the contents of the contract bei ng .. . a matter for negotiation.' 
In relation to section 43 , the Court stated, " in terms of s 43(a) the object of Part IV 
relating to enforcement is to establish that 'Employment contracts create enforceable 
rights and obligations. "'37 Therefore anything else, not expressly part of the agreement 
itself, should arguably have no effect. 
This did not however, mean that an employment contract did not contain an implied 
duty requiring mutual obligations of confidence, trust and fair dealing . This duty was 
held to exist, but not to affect what was capable of being implied into a contract: 38 
33 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGm1ir1 (i-loraki) [ 1998] 3 NZLR 276, 286 (CA). 
34 Aoraki , above, 284 . 
35 Aoraki, above, 284 . 
36 Aoraki, above, 28-l . 
37 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGavin (Aoraki) [1 998) 3 NZLR 276, 28-l-285 (CA). 
38 Aoraki, above, 285 . 
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Underlying the concept of unjustifiability, which is the yardstick by which personal grievances 
apply to claims of unjustifiable dismissal and ru1justifiable action under s27(l)(a) and (b) , are the 
mutual obligations of confidence, trust ru1d fair dealing which employers and employees owe to 
each otJ1er ... But it is well settled ... tJrnt tJrnt mutual obligation does not warrant the application 
of any different principles to tJ1e implication of terms in ... employment contracts tJ1an are 
applicable to other contracts. 
Employment contracts were therefore, to be interpreted in the same way as any other 
contract. 
( c) Equity and good conscience jurisdiction 
The Employment Court ' s equity and good conscience jurisdiction was held to be 
limited by section 104(3 ), where the Court said: 39 
The important qualification expressed in sl04(3) is tJ1at tJ1e exercise of the [Court' s equity and 
good conscience] jurisdiction crumot be inconsistent witJ1 tJ1e [ECA] or any other Act or witJ1 any 
applicable. .. employment contract. Thus it does not allow the Employment Court when 
determining a personal grievance to depart from tJ1e proper interpretation of " unjustifiably 
dismissed" witJ1in tJ1e meaning of s27(l)(a). It ca1mot frustrate tJ1e policy of the legislation. 
Likewise, it does not allow the Employment Court to substitute for tJ1e employment contract 
actually entered into a contract which tJ1e parties could have entered into. 
This followed Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hagg, which held that "it 
would be inconsistent with the ECA for the Employment Court to invoke the equity and 
good conscience jurisdiction to justify not giving effect to the applicable provisions of 
the ... [employment] contract."40 The ECA therefore:41 
Departs from tJ1e common law of contract in setting tJ1e yardstick of unjustifiable dismissal ... 
[and] in specif·ying procedures and remedies ... [ru1d altJ10ugh] tJ1e personal grievance provisions 
tJ1emselves [ could] be traced back to [the 1970s] ... tJ1e context in which tJ1ey operate is sharply 
changed by the emphasis in tJ1e [ECA] on contractual freedom . The remedies, too, are narrowed 
by the scheme and language of the whole statute. 
39 Aoraki, above, 286. 
40 Principal of A uckland College of Education v Hagg [ 1997] 2 NZLR 537, 5-l5 (CA). 
41 A oraki Corporation Ltd v J\JcGavin (Aoraki) [1998] 3 NZLR 276, 286-287 (CA). 
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This argument was also made by Richardson Jin Brighouse . 
Section 46(3) of the ECA relates to redundancy compensation payable. The 
Court held that this section also constrained the Employment Court. If the employment 
contract dealt with redundancy, but did not specify the level payable (or a formula to 
calculate it), the Courts did not have the jurisdiction to fix such compensation. 42 
The Court further stated that although this purely contractual approach could create 
tension with social and economic concerns, the responsibility on the Courts was to give 
effect to the intent of Parliament, as expressed by the ECA. 43 
(d) Redundancy under Aoraki 
As outlined above, Brighouse held that there was no general right to redundancy 
compensation, but it was nonetheless payable on redundancy, if it was considered 
necessary by the Court. In Aoraki, the Court held that this approach was incorrect and 
went against the underlying policy of contractual freedom in the ECA. The Court held 
that unless there was express mention of redundancy compensation in the employment 
contract, then procedural unfairness aside, no compensation was payable for the loss of 
the job itself To allow Brighouse to remain good law, would be to "[leave] the 
Employment Court with considerable flexibility to develop a concept of unjustifiable 
dismissal [beyond the principles of the ECA]."44 
The Court then went on to state the law regarding redundancy, taken from "[a] 
straightforward application of the 1991 Act. "45 Firstly, the justifiability of a redundancy 
is directed at considerations of moral justice and is not tied to common law rights . 
Conduct is unjustifiable if the employer cannot show it was just in all the circumstances. 
This requires a balancing of the employer ' s and the employee's rights 46 
42 Aoraki, above, 286 . 
43 A oraki, above, 287 . 
44 A oraki, above, 292. 
45 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGavin (.4oraki) [1998] 3 NZLR 276, 293 (CA). 
46 Aoraki , above, 293. 
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Secondly, the redundancy must be considered to see whether it was substantively 
unjustified, or in other words, whether the redundancy was genuine. In relation to this, it 
is for the employer to decide the strategy for restructuring as a matter of business 
judgment. It is not mandatory for the employer to consult with all affected employees, 
or consider redeployment, as this would be inconsistent with the employer's right to run 
their business as they choose. But in some circumstances, absence of consultation or 
consideration of redeployment, may cast doubt on the genuineness of the redundancy 
(or its timing). 47 Aoraki thus modifies Phipps, which held consultation was always 
mandatory (see above). Aoraki also fits within the Dunn selection criteria test (see 
above). Selection criteria remain a matter for the employer to decide, as long as they are 
relevant. In relation to criteria already negotiated in an employment contract, Priest and 
Ross v Fletcher Challenge Steel Ltd held that there was no further requirement on an 
employer to consult, regarding new selection criteria which were consistent with 
existing criteria, but only for extraneous criteria.48
 
Thirdly, if there is a genuine redundancy, the Court must consider whether the steps 
taken by the employer were unjust. This is the procedural fairness limb of the test. 
Remedies are available for a genuine redundancy that was nonetheless carried out in a 
procedurally unfair way. An employer is subject to obligations of good faith and fair 
dealing; and should therefore implement the redundancy in a fair and sensitive way.
49 In 
terms of notice, if the employment contract is silent, one month is reasonable . Fair 
treatment may call for : counselling, career and financial advice and retraining, relevant 
financial support and possibly other considerations relevant m particular 
circumstances. 50 
Fourthly, section 40(1) lists the remedies available for settling grievances. The Court 
held procedural unfairness remedies were only for " the wrong done to the employee .. 
[and that] the form of remedy must be directed to the particular wrong ... [therefore] the 
Employment Court [must] focus on the nature and scope of the personal grievance, 
47 Aoraki, above, 293-294. 
48 Priest and Ross v Fletcher Cha//enge Steel Ltd (1999) ( 14 October 1999) Employment Court Auckland 
AC81/99, 3 <http://\\'ww.lcxis.com/ rcscarch/rctrievc> (last accessed 11 April 2001). 
49 Aoraki Corporation Ltdv AfcGavin (Aoraki) [1998] 3 NZLR 276, 294 (CA). 
50 Aoraki, above, 294. 
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[including any trauma and stress caused]." 51 Section 40(1) remedies are also affected by 
the reason for the purported termination. For section 40(1) to apply, employment must 
be terminated in one of three ways: for cause, redundancy (insolvency, closure or 
restructuring) or on notice . 52 Under the ECA, there are just and unjust terminations ; 
only an unjust termination warrants personal grievance remedies. 53 This prevents a 
Brighouse-type compensation payment where the employee was properly made 
redundant but nonetheless seeks compensation solely for the loss of their job. In other 
words, there is no power under the ECA to award compensation for the loss of a job 
itself, if the employment contract does not include it. 54 Such extra-contractual 
redundancy payments would be contrary to the intention of the ECA: to promote 
contractual freedom. 55 
In relation to humiliation or distress payments, the Court held that section 
40(1 )( c )(i) required it to focus on the actual procedural unfairness, not the effects the 
loss of employment itself may have had .56 On the issue of quantum, the Court held that 
the amount payable depended on the factors involved in a particular case and how far 
short of the just employer standard the particular employer had been.57 On the facts, 
because consultation was not required (as restructuring was company-wide) and 
insufficient counselling was offered, as well the inducement of a false sense of job 
security by Aoraki Corporation, the Court ordered $15,000 in damages for the personal 
grievance. 58 Quantum is therefore restricted by the need for provable breaches of the 
standard required of employers and would usually be lower than previous decisions, 
because of the less stringent duties imposed by the contractual freedom approach. 
(e) Thomas J 
In his separate, but concurring judgment, Thomas J endorsed the Court 's general 
approach. Thomas J further held that Aoraki did not weaken the implied duty of fair 
51 Aoraki , above, 293 . 
52 Aoraki, above, 293 . 
53 Aoraki Corporation Ltdv AfcGavin (Aoraki) [1998] 3 NZLR 276,293 (CA). 
54 Aoraki, above, 295 . 
55 Aoraki, above, 295 . 
56 Aoraki, above, 295 . 
57 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGavin (Aoraki) [ 1998] 3 NZLR 276, 300 (CA). 
58 Aoraki, above, 300. 
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dealing between employer and employee,59 but it was nonetheless correct for the Court 
to hold that it did not allow the expansion of Parliamentary intent to include redundancy 
compensation where the contract was silent. 60 On the issue of procedural fairness, 
Thomas J held that a redundancy was not genuine, if adherence to a fair procedure 
would not have resulted in the position being made redundant; holding compensation 
would be available for such a redundancy. 61 But, if the procedural unfairness was 
inconsequential to the decision, then the redundancy would not be an unjustifiable 
dismissal. 62 
(t) Summary 
Aoraki therefore involves an approach to redundancy, which strictly adheres to 
the ECA's underlying policy of contractual freedom. The Court held that under the 
ECA, the justifiability of a redundancy was to be based on considerations of moral 
justice (not pre-existing common law rights). A personal grievance had to be directed at 
an actual wrong, as defined by the ECA, to warrant a remedy under the Act. 
Employment contracts fell to be interpreted in the same way as other contracts . 
The Employment Court was not able to imply provisions into a contract to grant 
compensation (or anything else), if the contract was silent. These implications would be 
in contravention of the ECA' s underlying contractual freedom policy; as well as being 
outside the jurisdiction of the Employment Court under the Act. The ECA itself 
departed from the common law in relation to the employment contract: defining 
unjustifiability, actionable grievances, remedies and requirements on the parties. These 
definitions had to be used by the Employment Court, so that the ECA was given proper 
effect. 
The Court did in general however, maintain the two-step test adopted by the 
earlier judgments outlined above: requiring a genuine redundancy (with modifications 
regarding required consultation and other matters) and a process which was 
59 Aoraki, above, 30-l. 
60 Aoraki , above, 306. 
61 Aoraki Corporation Ltd v A!cGavin (Aoraki) (1998] 3 NZLR 276, 306 (CA). 
62 Aoraki, above, 306. 
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procedurally fair (the material elements of procedural fairness being largely dependent 
on the parties' mutual obligations of good faith and fair dealing, as well as the parties ' 
particular circumstances) . 
4 Later ECA redundancy cases 
Following Aoraki the Courts, in general, truthfully applied the approach of that 
case. In New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites, the Court of Appeal applied 
Aoraki after the decision became available. The court below did not reach the same 
decision as the appellate court, because its decision was based on the earlier Brighouse 
line, as described above. 
Thwaites clarifies some points that were misapplied by the Court of Appeal in 
McKechnie Pacific (NZ) Ltd v Clemow. McKechnie held that the genuineness of a 
redundancy was vitiated by the employer ' s failure to offer a different, but suitable 
position. 64 Thwaites held that this was incorrect ; Aoraki did not go this far . Instead, it 
held :65 
In a situation of genuine redundancy . .. in the absence of a contractual provision to that effect. it 
cannot constitute w1justified dismissal not to offer t11e employee a different position . The 
relationship between employer ru1d employee applies in respect of the position and work t11e 
employee is contracted to provide ... it does not ex1end to any other position a Court might 
subsequently determine would be suitable to t11e employee. Nor does the obligation to dea l fa trly 
with an employee extend beyond t11e job in which he or she is employed. 
Thus Thwaites confirms the (possibly unclear) point tn Aoraki that failure to offer 
redeployment is not fatal , when the employment contract is silent as to this. In other 
words, the redundancy should be related to the position, not the person. The Court in 
Thwaites stated the genuineness of a redundancy of one position once established, 
cannot be negated by a failure to offer a different position. It must be remembered, 
however, that Aoraki does mention the possibility that failure to consider redeployment 
might in particular circumstances indicate an absence of genuineness - even though 
63 Aoraki, above, 307 . 
64 McKechnie Pacific (NZ) Ltd v Cle111ow [ 1998] 3 ERNZ 2-l5 , 251 (CA). 
65 New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites ([hwaites) [2000] 2 NZLR 565, 572 (CA). 
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redeployment (along with consultation) was held not to be mandatory, but instead a 
decision for the employer. 
Thwaites further states that a genuine redundancy can nonetheless be 
procedurally unfair in certain respects, resulting in a breach of the employer's duty of 
fair treatment:66 
Except in cases where failure to consult and consider redeployment, taken in the whole context 
of circumstances, constitute evidence of lack of genuineness in t11e decision to declare a position 
redtmdant, such failure, where it falls below the conduct of a reasonable employer acting fairly, 
may entitle t11e employee to a remedy but not to an order t11at t11e dismissal was not for 
redundancy 
Thus Thwaites states it is possible for procedural fairness breaches to occur and warrant 
remedies, but the position is still redundant. This could be seen as blurring the 
distinction between genuineness and procedural fairness, but is not arguably of 
importance in relation to the whole exercise of determining whether an employer has 
acted fairly. 
On the issue of genuineness, Thwaites held that if a new, restructured position 
involved substantially the same responsibilities as a purportedly redundant one, this did 
not mean the old position was not redundant. Instead, the Court held:67 
While some positions might become surplus to requirements abruptly, as on a restructuring .. . 
many will diminish over time to a point when it is recognised t11ey should be declared .. . 
redru1dant ... It would be quite ru1realistic to regard t11e position as encompassing only those 
residual duties remaining at t11e time t11e inevitable is recognised. To do t11at would be to penalise 
employers for retaining employees longer t11a11 is necessary ... It must be open for ilie employer 
to assess t11e requirements of the business wit11 respect to positions. 
Carter Holt Harvey v Wallis held the test to be used when determining whether two 
positions were substantially similar was objective. It was necessary to ask whether a 
reasonable person would consider there to be a sufficient difference between the two 
positions to break the continuity of employment, having regard to the characteristics of 
66 Thwaites, above, 573. 
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both positions and the employee.68 If the positions were substantially similar, it would 
not be a genuine redundancy. Howard v NZ Pastoral Agricultural Research Institute 
adopted a similar test, based on the positions' significant differences not being great 
enough to establish the old position's genuine redundancy.69 
These decisions run counter to the Thwaites argument. Thwaites does specifically reject 
the substantially similar responsibilihes test used7° and is the later authority. But, 
Thwaites does not completely override this test however, as the decision can be seen as 
a modification to the rule for factual circumstances involving a gradual decline in a 
position's duties, as opposed to an abrupt redundancy. The test using substantial 
similarity of positions to vitiate a genuine redundancy therefore remains good law, 71 but 
as modified by Thwaites. 
In his partially dissenting judgment, Thomas J held that although the Court of 
Appeal had frequently reiterated that damages awarded for wrongful dismissal claims 
should be restrained, this resulted in inadequate compensation and therefore the remedy 
provided under the ECA was largely ineffective. The need for an employer to be fair 
was enhanced where the employee was essentially blameless. 72 It is therefore evident, 
that quantum under the ECA, while modest, was beginning to be seen by some members 
of the judiciary as too low. What would have happened without Parliamentary 
intervention via the ERA however, is outside the scope of this paper. 
5 Summary of redundancy under the ECA 
Thwaites succinctly summarises the post-Aoraki ECA approach as follows : 73 
Redundancy is determined in relation to !11e position not !11e incwnbent. Whe!11er a position is 
truly redundant is a matter of business judgment for !11e employer. The genuineness of any 
determination of redLmdancy can be reviewed. If it is not one !11e employer acting reasonably and 
67 Thwaites, above, 572-573. 
68 Carter Holt Harvey v Wallis [1998) 3 ERNZ 98-l, 985 (EC). 
69 Howard v NZ Pasioral Agricultural Research Institute Ltd [1999) 2 ERNZ -l79, 481 (EC). 
70 Ne w Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites (fhwaites) [2000] 2 NZLR 565, 572 (CA). 
7 1 See The Laws of New Zealand (But1crwor!11s, Wellington, 2000) vol l lA Employment, para 43 . 
72 Thwaites, above, 577. 
73 Thwaites , above, 571-572. 
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in good fait11 could have reached it may be impeached. In any review it may be relevant t11at t11e 
employer did not consult with affected employees or consider whet11er t11e redundancy could 
have been avoided by redeployment or ot11erwise. Absence of such steps might in particular 
circumstances indicate absence of genuineness in the determination. Where t11ere is a genuine 
redunda11cy that will justify termination of the employment of the person in t11e position. In t11e 
course of the employer's consideration of the position and in carrying out t11e dismissal t11e 
obligation of good faith and fair treatment applies. Any failure to discharge t11at obligation tlrnt 
in itself is w1justifiable may result in remedies appropriate to t11e breach. 
Savage v Unlimited Architecture Ltd confirms the onus as being on the employer 
regarding justification, once the employee had established the dismissal and that it was 
attended with some unfair treatment. 74 The employer had to show they had acted 
reasonably in treating redundancy as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee. 75 
Chief Judge Goddard stated this approach "readily [fitted] ... a system in which the 
concern is with the question whether a dismissal is justifiable or not. 76 This position can 
be contrasted with Thwaites, in which the Court held that the sole focus must be on the 
position, not the individual, when considering the genuineness of the redundancy (see 
above). The difference of opinion is perhaps resolved by stating that the Court in 
Thwaites was discussing redeployment only; not the employer's duty to explain how the 
overall redundancy was justified for the particular employee, in relation to the criteria 
used in selection and so on. 
As to the applicability of the Aoraki approach, Chief Judge Goddard stated that 
the case was a judgment given upon a particular fact situation and that it was not 
legislation. It was not to be applied to all situations, regardless of the differences 
capable of distinguishing the case; for instance where only singular or small group 
redundancies were involved. 77 
Chief Judge Goddard further stated that the underlying assumption in Aoraki 
was that the condition required for a genuine redundancy was that the position itself, 
had disappeared. If this was not the case, an employer would not be entitled to a finding 
74 Sm,age v Unli111ited A rchitecture Ltd (Savage) (1999] 2 ERNZ 40, 52 (EC). 
75 Savage, above, 50. 
76 Savage, above, 50-51. 
77 Savage, above, 50. 
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that the termination was substantially justified, under Aoraki. 78 This was because the 
integrity of a redundancy decision could also be compromised in part, by its application 
to particular individuals for reasons other than that their jobs had gone. A third 
compensation-founding category (after non-genume and procedurally unfair 
redundancies) was therefore identified: a genuine redundancy, which was nonetheless 
procedurally unfair. Chief Judge Goddard stated that Aorak; treated this situation as "all 
or nothing ... going to the genuineness of the redundancy [only]." 79 However, it can be 
argued this position was recognised adequately by Aoraki, because a procedurally unfair 
process was still grounds for a remedy under the ECA. The fact that it went to 
genuineness is not overly important - it was still a remedy. 
The warning sounded by Chief Judge Goddard in Savage, does not seem to have 
been much listened to . Most of the cases following Aorah (as mentioned above) have 
faithfully applied its approach, or attempted to. Thus the weight which is given to Chief 
Judge Goddard's comments regarding Aoraki must be treated with some caution. Of 
course his Honour is correct, regarding the doctrine of precedent's requirement to apply 
precedents to like situations. But the cases which have followed Aoraki and which fell 
to be decided under the ECA, have nonetheless largely confirmed its position. 
In summary, the ECA has restricted the former common law redundancy 
position. Although redundancy itself is not mentioned in the Act, the Courts have held 
that it sets the limits of what qualifies as a personal grievance, the remedies available for 
personal grievances and the duties on the parties in an employment contract. The main 
effect being that the ECA' s underlying policy of contractual freedom has prevented the 
Courts from interfering with what the parties themselves, have included in their 
agreements. The next part of this paper will examine the impact of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 on redundancy law. 
78 Savage v Unlimited Architecture Lie/ (Savage) [ 1999] 2 ERNZ 40, 50 (EC). 
79 Savage, above, 49. 
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III REDUNDANCY UNDER THE ERA 
A Good Faith 
1 The Act 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 establishes a different approach to 
employment relations than that of its predecessor. Section 3(a) states the object of the 
Act as building productive employment relationships through the promotion of mutual 
trust and confidence in all aspects of the employment environment and of the 
employment relationship. Section 3(a)(i) states this is to be achieved by recognising that 
employment relationships must be built on good faith behaviour and in section 3(a)(ii), 
by acknowledging and addressing the inherent inequality of bargaining power in 
employment relationships . Section 4(1 )(a) states parties to employment relationships 
must deal with each other in good faith . Section 4( 4) states this duty applies to (inter 
alia) ( c) consultation between employers and employees, including the effect on 
employees of changes to the employer's business; (d) contracting out work; and (e) 
making employees redundant. 
Thus, it is evident that the ERA creates a statutory duty of good faith , which is required 
to be adhered to by an employer, including in the area of redundancy. This duty is 
stricter than under the ECA, where it does exist but because it is implied into an 
employment contract, it is not able to trump the ECA's contractual freedom policy by 
imposing extra-judicial requirements on an agreement, which the parties did not 
contemplate. As outlined above, this was considered contrary to the object of the ECA. 
2 Judicial approach 
The leading case concerning redundancy under the ERA is Baguley v Coutts 
Cars Limited. This case involved an allegation of unjustified dismissal related to a 
redundancy at a car grooming company. The Employment Court sat as a full bench and 
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unanimously ruled in favour of the appellant employee. On the issue of ECA case law, 
the Court stated :80 
The passing of the [ERA] is a proper and necessary occasion ... to revisit first principles and to 
determine how the law has been modified by the new legislation. The [ECA] has been repealed. 
A markedly different regime has been established in its place. It is therefore not satisfactory to 
make decisions in reliance on cases decided while the [ECA] was in force unless they state 
principles of general application as opposed to principles peculiarly arising out of the [ECA] . 
The Court stated that Aoraki was "a case very much in point [and] as the Court of 
Appeal made plain [in Aoraki], that decision was tied very much to the [ECA]. "8 1 
The Court then held that the ERA abolishes or reverses the Aoraki-ECA 
approach to redundancy in its key provisions: section 3 (particularly paragraphs (a)(i) 
and (ii)) in outlining the object of the Act as the advancement of good faith and the 
promotion of International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions related to collective 
bargaining ( described below); and section 4, in creating a statutory duty of good faith . 82 
In relation to Aoraki, the Court held that the following principles from that case 
would no longer apply : firstly , the ECA was no longer the source of law regarding 
unjustified dismissal; secondly, the ECA's purely contractual approach was also not 
applicable . It no longer mattered that a contract was silent regarding an employer's 
obligations; thirdly (although obiter) the Court held ILO conventions could no longer be 
disregarded. 83 
Section 189(1) of the ERA states the Court can use its equity and good 
conscience jurisdiction expressly for the purpose of supporting successful employment 
relationships. The Court held that this indicated that behaviours that were previously 
80 Baguley v Coutts Cars Limited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 13 Goddard CJ. 
81 Baguley, above, 13 . 
82 Bagu!ey, above, 15. 
83 Baguley, above, 16. 
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sanctioned, merely because they were not prohibited by an employment agreement, may 
not be able to be relied on any longer. 84 
Thus under the ERA, employers must give effect to their duty of good faith to the point 
where formerly they would not have had to, because the employment contract was silent 
regarding a particular issue. In other words, the duty of good faith under the ERA is 
superimposed upon an employment agreement,85 irrespective of the wishes of the 
employer. 86 This is in stark contrast to the ECA position, where contractual freedom 
reigned supreme and the equity and good conscience jurisdiction could not be used if it 
conflicted with the Act itself Although the ERA also states this, 87 the purpose of use 
just described follows the ERA's underlying policy . Furthermore, the duty of good faith 
expressly applies when consultations are in progress (including where an employer 
undertakes voluntary consultation) and also if a proposal is being made that could 
possibly impact on their employees. 88 
Baguley approved of two Canadian authorities regarding their common sense 
approach to the duty of good faith . 89 Carrick v Cooper Canada Ltd concerned an action 
for mental distress caused by a dismissal. The Ontario Supreme Court held that because 
the employer was in a fiduciary relationship with their employee, it owed the employee 
a duty to treat him with concern and common decency.90 Bernadin v Alitalia Air Lines 
involved an action of wrongful dismissal based on inadequate notice being given. The 
Quebec Superior Court allowed the action in part, stating that:9 1 
While an employer is entitled to put an end to the contract of employment ... it is nevertheless 
incumbent upon the employer to do so in a maMer which will not cause w1due stress, anxiety or 
grief. 
84 Baguley v Coutts Cars Limited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, I 6 Goddard CJ. 
85 Sections 3, 4. 
86 Arguably, most employees would consider this beneficial. 
87 Section 189. 
88 Baguley, above, 16. 
89 Baguley, above, 20 . 
90 Carrick v Cooper Canada Ltd [1983] 2 CCEL 87, para 100. 
91 Bernadin v A litalia Air Lines (1993) 50 CCEL 156, para 17. 
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These cases reflect the New Zealand approach as outlined by the Courts. In summary 
therefore, parties to employment agreements under the ERA owe each other duties of 
good faith, which should be applied in a common sense, not overly legalistic, way. 
However, this duty goes beyond mere direct and honest dealings between the parties : it 
is all-pervasive; not least because of its statutory source, as opposed to the duty of fair 
dealing implied by common law when the ECA was in force .92 
3 !LO conventions 
The ERA heralds a return to collectivist principles of previous legislation and 
involves some discarding of free contractual bargaining. 93 This is replaced by doctrines 
of good faith and the principles underlying ILO convention 87 on freedom of 
association and convention 98 on the right to organise/bargain collectively. Convention 
87 provides (inter alia) that workers have the right to establish and join organisations of 
their own choice without governmental interference and also to draw up their own rules. 
Convention 98 provides (inter alia) that workers must be protected against 
discrimination on the grounds of union membership; it also protects collective 
bargaining through the autonomy of the parties and voluntary nature of negotiations. 94 
What the ERA therefore achieves, is the establishment of New Zealand law based on 
fundamental ILO concepts of worker's rights. This is in contrast to the ECA where, as 
discussed above, the Court of Appeal explicitly stated that this Act was not based on the 
ILO, but was rather a unique entity unto itself 
92 Christine French "Employers and Good Faith" in E111ploy111e11t Lall' Conference (NZ Law Society) 
Wellington 23-2./ November 2000 (ButterwortJ1s, Wellington, 2000) 13 , 15. 
93 Baguley v Coutts Cars limited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 16 Goddard CJ. 
94 Paul Roth "The Employment Relations Act and International Labour Organisation Conventions 87 and 
98" in Employment Law Conference (NZ Law Society) Wellington 23-2./ November 2000 (ButterwortJ1s. 
Wellington, 2000) 79, 81. 
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B Personal Grievances under the ERA 
l The Act 
Section 102 of the ERA states an employee may pursue a perceived personal 
grievance under the Act. Section 103(1) defines a personal grievance as any grievance 
against an employer because of the reasons listed, including in section 103(l)(a) 
unjustified dismissal claims. Section 113( 1) states the personal grievance provisions of 
the ERA are the only means available to an employee to challenge a dismissal. 
In relation to personal gnevances, the Court in Baguley firstly considered 
Auckland City Council v Hennessey, where Somers J stated, "good industrial relations 
depend upon management not only acting fairly but being manifestly seen to act 
fairly." 95 It held that the ERA went further than this:96 
[The ERA's] object is to build productive employment relationships through the promotion of 
mutual trust and confidence ... In relation to personal grievances, t11e Act says [in section 101] 
'The object of t11is part is (a) to recognise tl1at, in resolving employment relationship problems. 
access to both infonnation and mediation services is more important t11an adherence to rigid 
formal procedures.' 
2 Dismissal not the substantive issue 
The Court stated that a personal grievance was brought in Baguley because of 
the unjustified dismissal. However, this was only the superficial issue:97 
Il is timely to recall tl1at. form t11e earliest days of this jurisdiction under sl 17 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973 it has been held t11at it is ... not ... a process aimed at producing cut and dned 
answers to aJiegations ... [but] t11e settlement of personal grievances ... The wider issue of the 
worker's grievance is tlie direct issue for assessment and resolution rat11er t11an t11e underlying 
complaint of dismissal.. . The focus on t11e settlement of personal grievances remains - sec s l 23 
of the [ERA] . 
95 Auckland City Council v Hennessey [ 1982] ACJ 699, 703 (CA). 
96 Baguley, above, 17. 
97 Baguley v Couus Cars li111ited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 4 Goddard CJ. 
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Therefore, the Court's role is to settle the underlying cause of the complaint and not the 
more procedural, rather than substantive, label given to the personal grievance. While 
the focus is on unjustified dismissal, the grievance is about the way the employer treated 
the employee; the action being unjustified precisely because it was wanting in good 
faith . 98 
3 Main components 
The Court stated that a personal grievance for unjustified dismissal was a well-
established remedy, describing it as follows: 99 
It is against the law for an employer to dismiss an employee unjustifiably . A dismissal will be 
justifiable only if the employer can show that a fair and reasonable employer would have 
dismissed at the time and in the circwnstances. Genuine redundancy can justify a dismissal 
provided tJ1e proper notice of termination is given and a proper payment made of any 
compensation provided for as a term of the bargain ... Today, we accept also tJiat a redundancy 
may be genuine tJ10ugh avoidable and tJ1ough tJ1e result of initiative on tJ1e part of ilie employer. 
Thus it is evident that the genuineness of a redundancy remains part of the test for a 
justifiable dismissal for redundancy. In relation to procedural fairness, the Court held : ' 00 
Selection of employees for redtmdancy, where tJ1cre is a choice, must be fair. A fair procedure 
must be followed. The situation must be handled sensitively. AltJ10ugh a dismissal for 
redundancy can be a justified dismissal, it too must pass tJ1e test of fairness and 
reasonableness.. . What is fair and reasonable now depends on tJ1e facts and circumstances of 
each case. It also depends on tJ1e current law. The jurisprudence developed under tJ1e [ECAJ 
focused on tJ1e presence or absence of an obligation to consult as a tenn of the employment 
contract. Now that tJ1e spotlight is on the employment relationship, it is not necessary or 
permissible to speak in terms of consultation being mandatory in all cases or of never being 
required. Usually it will be. The [ERAJ strongly suggests so ... [for example] section 101 ... 
highlights tJ1e importance of access to information. 
98 Bagu!ey, above, 17. 
99 Baguley. above, 17. 
100 Bagu!ey, above, 17-18. 
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The Court held that the ERA requires a new approach to the question whether the 
employer acted as a fair and reasonable employer would. This is still a question of fact 
and degree, but is informed by Parliament's intention to reform the nature of the 
employment relationship . 101 A common sense assessment of the situation is required, 
bearing the following factors in mind: 
-I 
(i) The employer's business requirements ... These could be postponed for a short time, or long 
enough to accommodate the other factors;1 °2 
(ii) The employee's right to relevant infonnation or dialogue consultation ... This will usually 
require some real dialogue with the employee, starting with the provision in good faith, of 
accurate information. Also, the employer finding out what would cause the employee the most 
havoc, so as to avoid it; as well as what will injure them the least in order to try and achieve it. 
Redeployment is also relevant , as well as selecting employees for redw1dancy if there is a 
choice. The commercial decision remains the employer's, however the timely provision of useful 
information ·will often be decisive of the justness of the employer's actions/ 03 
(iii) The employer's ability to mitigate the blow to the employee. Consultation with aiiected 
employees may help the employer here;104 
(iv) The nature of the employment relationshjp as one calling for good faith . This involves 
recognising the employee's worth as a human being even if no longer valued or required as an 
employee. 105 
Other procedural fairness issues 
Regarding selection criteria for redundancy, the Baguley upheld the Dunn v 
Methanex test (as outlined above) but stated " [while] employers are entitled to 
considerable latitude when redundancies are looming in deciding upon the [selection] 
criteria to use [and] to exercise discretion in applying the criteria ... they must do so 
101 Baguley v Coutts Cars Limited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 200 l) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 18 Goddard CJ. 
102 Baguley , above. 18. 
103 Baguley, above, 18-19. 
104 Baguley , above, 19. 
105 Baguley v Coulls Cars limited (Baguley) (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 19 Goddard CJ. 
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honestly and openly."
106 
The Court also approved of Mmfitt v Centrepoint Ltd, where 
Shaw J held: 107 
The adoption of a fair process in relation to aliected employees should not derogate from the 
employer's ultimate prerogative. However the prerogative does not gjve the employer carte 
blanche to select individual employees on irrelevant grounds or without proper inquiry as to t11e 
employee's suitability or not. 
Therefore, what is required under the ERA regarding selection criteria 1s that an 
employer selects appropriate criteria based on relevant grounds and applies them to 
relevant employees honestly and openly after proper inquiry. This would also involve 
informing the employees affected of what the criteria are, as a duty of good faith 
requirement. 
In terms of notice to be given, the Court held that all non-fixed term contracts 
could be terminated on notice, but this would not always be a justified dismissal. The 
proper notice period was that given in the employment agreement and if this was silent, 
then the period had to be a reasonable one; which in turn, was a question of fact. 108 On 
the facts, the appellant had worked in a junior position for two years. The Court held 
that one month's notice was reasonable, because of the relatively short service period 
and the level of the position held. 109 
5 Remedies under the ERA 
Section 123 of the ERA states the remedies available for a personal grievance . 
Section 125 states reinstatement under section 123(l)(a) is the primary remedy; which 
also includes (b) reimbursement of lost wages or other money; and ( c) compensation, 
including for (i) humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings . 
Baguley states damages may be recoverable (in an appropriate case) for a breach 
of section 4 good faith . On the facts, this was not possible here because the action was a 
106 Baguley, above, 19. 
107 
Afurjill v Centrepoint Ltd [1999] 2 ERNZ 955,967 (EC). 
108 
Baguley, above, 19. 
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personal grievance for which the ERA prescribes the available remedies under section 
123. 110 Remedies may also be affected by the nature of the employer's conduct, if this 
has been such as to inflame the injury caused to the employee. 111 
Baguley further held that remedies should only be discussed after the employer's 
behaviour has been found to be unjustifiable. This is because the proper vehicle for 
punishing a wrong employer is an action for a penalty or properly formulated action for 
damages under the Act. 112 Section 125 of the ERA states reinstatement is the primary 
remedy unless impracticable. Baguley affirms this and further states that reimbursement 
of lost wages and compensation for non-exhaustive, specified injuries are also still 
available. The underlying philosophy of the personal grievance jurisdiction is that the 
appellant employee is made whole again .113 
In deciding on a remedy the Court, under section 192(1) of the ERA, cannot 
vary or cancel a clause of a collective employment agreement. It can however, suspend 
an aspect of an agreement and order the parties to reopen bargaining regarding that 
aspect. This restriction supports the concept that the Court's role is in identifying the 
rights of the parties and their problems and not fixing their chosen terms or conditions 
of employment. 114 Similarly, section 189 of the ERA states that the exercise of equity 
and good conscience jurisdiction cannot be contrary to the parties' employment 
agreement. This is one aspect of similarity with the old act. 11 5 
As mentioned above, the Court held that principles derived from ECA case law 
could only remain under the ERA if they involved general points. Baguley adopted 
several such relevant factors in relation to determining remedies or compensation levels, 
from Aorak; as follows : 11 6 
' 09 Bagu/ey v Co utts Cars limited (/Jagu/ey) (2001 ) (3 April 2001 ) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00, 24 Goddard CJ. 
' '
0 Baguley, above, 21 . 
111 Bagu/ey , above, 21 . 
11 2 Baguley, above, 21. 
113 Baguley v Coufls Cars Limited (Bagu/ey) (200 l) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland ARC 
2/00. 21 Goddard CJ. 
114 The Laws of New Zealand (Buttenvort11s, Wellington. 2000) vol l lA Employment, para 35. 11 5 Section 10-l(3). 
116 Baguley, above, 24. 
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• The circumstances surrounding notification of redw1dancy, 
• The abruptness of the dismissal meeting, 
• The failure to give adequate reasons, 
• The absence or inadequacy of prior warning, 
• Inducing a false sense of security in the employee, which increases the blow, 
• The nature of counselling offered and what was actually given. 
The foregoing is a non-exhaustive list of possibly relevant factors to consider, when 
weighing the decisions taken by the employer and their subsequent actions, in relation 
to any remedy allowed the employee. 
In relation to quantum of damages, the Court held that $10,000 was a modest 
amount to award for hurt and humiliation under section 123(c)(i). The appellant was 
also awarded $5,700 for loss of benefits under section 123(c)(ii) of the Act. 11 7 
Therefore, under the ERA, an aggrieved employee is likely to receive a higher monetary 
award than under the ECA, where (as described above) the quantum received was 
restricted to quite low amounts. 
C Summary of ERA Redundancy 
Redundancy compensation m a given case 1s still a question of what the 
employment agreement states as a record of the parties' intentions. However, the whole 
approach to the employment relationship of the parties has been altered to reflect the 
emphasis in the ERA on fair dealing and good faith. What an employer has to show in 
order to be justified in making employees redundant still involves the concept of a 
genuine redundancy implemented in a procedurally fair way, but the legal benchmarks 
that must be reached in order to satisfy these tests have been raised by the new Act. 
Remedies are also different, with the emphasis on reinstatement, where practicable. 
The duty of good faith on employers remains in force, despite what is written in 
an employment agreement. Thus, it is not possible to rely on the silence of an agreement 
(as under the ECA) in order to state a certain requirement is not necessary. Consultation 
is a prime example. Under the ECA, the Courts held that this was not always required . 
II 
• • • 
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• 
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Under the ERA however, the statute's emphasis on good faith means an employer would 
seldom be able to avoid consultation with their employees regarding possible 
redundancies. The ERA therefore, practically restores the position under Phipps where 
consultation was held mandatory (see above) . This suggests the requirement may also 
prevent an employer from proceeding with restructuring plans before proper dialogue, 
beginning with the provision of accurate information in good faith , had been entered 
into with affected employees.11 8 
As stated above, the ERA departs from the ECA's emphasis on contractual 
freedom in favour of a return to more collectivist principles and the realisation that 
almost total freedom of contract can often result in the employee being in a substantially 
weaker position than they otherwise could be. This inevitably means employers will feel 
pressured, but arguably helps to ensure employees are not left at the mercy of their 
"rights to contract freely" as under the ECA. It has been argued however, that the ERA's 
statute based good faith approach still allows a Court to improvise terms in an 
employment agreement in a Brighouse-type way. 11 9 The Act itself supports this idea; 
see for example section 192 . 
Because Bagu fey is the only ERA redundancy decision to date, some speculation 
is required as to what the Court of Appeal would decide on an appeal of this case. In 
this regard, it is important to remember that Baguley held ECA case law was only to be 
considered if it offered general points not arising peculiarly from the Act itself What 
are perhaps more pertinent to consider, are decisions predating the Aoraki-ECA 
approach. These decisions are more likely to discuss general redundancy principles, as 
well as to more closely approximate the ERA's object of promoting productive 
employment relationships based on good faith , because their focus extends beyond 
contractual freedom . What must also be remembered is that although the ERA changes 
much of the ECA position, the ERA is still a forward-looking act. It does not seek to 
117 Baguley, above, 2-l-25 . 
11 8 See Peter Cullen "Employment Matters: Landmark case sets job relations on new course" (11 April 
2001) The Dominion Wellington 29. 
119 Christine French "Employers and Good Faith" in E111ploy111ent Law Conference (NZ Law Society) 
Wellington 23-2-1 November 2000 (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 13, 15. 
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return completely to the era of pre-ECA industrial law.120 Rather, the ERA attempts to 
redress an imbalance towards favouring the employer in the employment relationship. 
Bearing this in mind, it is arguable that the Court of Appeal would uphold the decision 
of the Employment Court. Under a Brighouse-type argument, Michael Baguley was 
unjustifiably dismissed and not treated fairly by his employer. On the facts, a genuine 
reason for the redundancy was present, but the manner in which it was carried out was 
procedurally unfair. Similarly, under Phipps the test of whether a fair and reasonable 
employer (see above) would have treated him in that way is also not met. 
The Court of Appeal in W&H Newspapers Ltd v Oram recently used afair and 
reasonable employer test in relation to an employer's decision to dismiss a journalist for 
serious misconduct. The Court held that it was not an unfair dismissal if the employer 
could show that their decision to dismiss was one a fair and reasonable employer could 
have made. 121 Oram has however been criticised, because this test was seen as 
subjective and in favour of the employer, instead of the more balanced test involving a 
relatively abstract and reasonable employer as applied previously.122 Oram may also 
indicate that the Employment Court should not attempt to set objective and impartial 
standards of fairness when considering the actions of an employer regarding 
dismissal. 123 What impact this judgment would have on a Baguley Court of Appeal is 
unclear. Nevertheless, it endorses the broad type of test used in this context: one in a 
similar vein to Ph;pps (above). It must also be remembered that this case was not related 
to redundancy and was decided under the ECA. Therefore it is unlikely that the Court of 
Appeal, faced with a statutory recognition of the inherent inequality in employment 
relationships (absent under Oram) in a redundancy situation, would impose a test of 
fairness which favoured the already dominant party in the employment relationship . 
The problem with this analysis however, is that on these facts, the case would 
probably have been resolved the same way under the Aoraki-ECA approach. The issue 
of procedural unfairness would still have been present. But the quantum awarded would 
120 Gordon Anderson, Associate Professor (Victoria University Industrial Law Lecture, Wellington, 18 
July 2001). 
12 1 IV&H Newspapers Ltd v Oram (3 May 2001) Court of Appeal CA l-l0/00, para 31 Gault J. 
122 E111p/oyment Law Bulletin (Bultenvorths, Wellington, 2001 Issue -l) 73, 77. 
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also arguably be less under the Aoraki-ECA approach. Nevertheless, the statutory 
requirement of good faith under the ERA provides another way for the applicant to 
challenge his employer's conduct. 
IV CONCLUSION 
The main distinction in the approach to redundancy under the ECA and the ERA 
relates to the underlying policy difference between these acts. The ECA involved an 
underlying policy of contractual freedom . This meant that employers and employees 
were largely free to draft their own agreements without the need for perceived undue 
legislative interference. In terms of redundancy law, this manifested itself in the Aoraki 
decision, which began a line of cases that in promoting the policy of the Act prevented 
an employee from succeeding in a personal grievance where their employment contract 
did not include reference to redundancy compensation. The implied duty of good faith 
held to exist in an employment relationship could not protect an employee in a 
redundancy situation from a lack of consultation or other procedural fairness aspects, 
which were often optional for an employer. 
In contrast, the ERA has a fundamentally altered object. The Act replaces 
contractual freedom with the promotion of productive employment relationships and the 
promotion of an enhanced, statutory requirement for mutual good faith . It also 
recognises the inherent inequality of bargaining power, which results where parties are 
free to contract as they wish . An employer cannot rely on their agreement being silent to 
avoid consulting with their employees if a redundancy situation arises. Furthermore, 
procedural fairness requirements are enhanced under the ERA by the good faith 
requirement. In relation to redundancy compensation however, the employment 
agreement's terms still prevail , as long as they reflect good faith and fair dealing. What 
an employer must show to justify a dismissal for redundancy, while still based on a 
genuine redundancy and a procedurally fair implementation, has been made more 
demanding. In retaining this framework, although the change in policy under the ERA 
has been fundamental , the impact on redundancy as a discrete area of the law has not. 
123 E111ploy 111e11t Law Bulletin , above, 78. 
V RESOURCES 
A Legislation 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, No. 22 
Employment Relations Act 2000, No. 24 
B Cases 
l ECA section 
Aoraki Cotporation v McGavin [1998] 3 NZLR 276 
Auckland Regional Council v Sanson [1999] 2 ERNZ 597 
Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck [1995] 1 NZLR 158 
Carter Holt Harvey v Pirie [1997] ERNZ 648 
Carter Holt Harvey v Wallis [1998] 3 ERNZ 984 
Dunn v Methanex NZ Ltd [1996] 2 ERNZ 222 
EDS (New Zealand) Limited v Inglis (2000) (13 November 2000) Court of Appeal CA 
228/99 Keith J 
GNHale &SonLtdv Wellington, etc, Caretakers, etc, IUW[l99l] 1 NZLR 151 
Howard v NZ Pastoral Agricultural Research Institute Ltd [1999] 2 ERNZ 479 
McKechnie Pacific (NZ) Ltd v Clemow [1998] 3 ERNZ 245 
35 
New Zealand Budding Trades Union v Hawkes Bay Area Health Board [1992] 2 ERNZ 
897 
New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites [2000] 2 NZLR 565 
Phipps v New Zealand Fishing Indust,y Board [1996] 1 ERNZ 195 
Priest and Ross v Fletcher Challenge Steel Ltd (1999) (14 October 1999) Employment 
Court Auckland AC 81/99 Judge Colgan 
Principal of Auckland College of Education v Hagg [1997] 2 NZLR 537 
Rolls v Wellington Gas Co Ltd [1998] 3 ERNZ 116 
Ross v Wellington Free Ambulance Service Inc [1999] 2 ERNZ 325 
Savage v Unlimited Architecture Ltd [1999] 2 ERNZ 40 
2 ERA section 
Apia/a v Telecom New Zealand Ltd [1998] 2 ERNZ 130 
Auckland City Council v Hennessey [1982] ACJ 699 
36 
Baguley v Coutts Cars Limited (2001) (3 April 2001) Employment Court Auckland 
ARC 2/00 Goddard CJ, Travis J, Shaw J 
Bernadin v Alitalia Air Lines [1993] 50 CCEL 156 
Carrick v Cooper Canada Ltd (1983) 2 CCEL 87 
Mwfitt v Centrepoinl Ltd [1999] 2 ERNZ 955 
Parsons v Upper Hutt City Council (2000) (19 December 2000) Employment Court 
Wellington WEC 38/00 Shaw J 
Parsons v Upper Hutt City Council (2000) (24 May 2000) Employment Tribunal 
Wellington WET 910/99 RE Hall 
W &H Newspapers Ltd v Oram (3 May 2001) Court of Appeal CA 140/00, para 31 
Gault J 
C Bibliography 
Christine French "Employers and Good Faith" in Employment Law Conference (NZ 
Law Society) Wellington 23-2-1 November 2000 
Employment Law Bulletin (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) Issue 4 
Stephen Gibbs ( ed) Butterworths Employment Law Guide (3 ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997) 951. 
Paul Roth "The Employment Relations Act and International Labour Organisation 
Conventions 87 and 98" in Employment Law Conference (NZ Law Society) Wellington 
23-2-1 November 2000 
Peter Cullen "Employment Matters: Landmark case sets job relations on new course" 
(11 April 2001) The Dominion Wellington 29 
The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) vol 1 lA Employment 
LAW LIBRARY 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
~f 1ijf 1I1i11~, ~,i111r1r1~111~ij1f r 11ij111r,11 1i111111[111111ij~~ij~ 
3 7212 00618830 2 
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
B189 
2001 
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
B189 
2001 

